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Abstract: Automated analysis of privacy policies has
proved a fruitful research direction, with developments
such as automated policy summarization, question an-
swering systems, and compliance detection. So far, prior
research has been limited to analysis of privacy policies
from a single point in time or from short spans of time,
as researchers did not have access to a large-scale, longi-
tudinal, curated dataset. To address this gap, we devel-
oped a crawler that discovers, downloads, and extracts
archived privacy policies from the Internet Archive’s
Wayback Machine. Using the crawler and natural lan-
guage processing, we curated a dataset of 1,071,488
English language privacy policies, spanning over two
decades and over 130,000 distinct websites.
Our analyses of the data show how the privacy pol-
icy landscape has changed over time and how websites
have reacted to the evolving legal landscape, such as the
adoption of privacy seals and the impact of new regula-
tions such as the GDPR. Our results suggest that pri-
vacy policies underreport the presence of tracking tech-
nologies and third parties. We find that, over the last
twenty years, privacy policies have more than doubled
in length and the median reading level, while already
challenging, has increased modestly.
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ing, regulation
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1 Introduction
Privacy policies are one of the few available lenses to
understand the privacy practices of companies. In the
modern web ecosystem, a dominant revenue stream for
many websites is the monetization of users’ browsing
activities, which often reveals sensitive personal infor-
mation to third parties such as advertisers and data
brokers. Thus, understanding privacy policies is crucial
for understanding the web.
Unfortunately, privacy policies are long and difficult
to read [1] and may contain legal and technical jargon
that is not accessible to an average user.
Here we focus on making privacy policies useful to
researchers rather than directly to users. While there is
an extensive line of research on privacy policies (Sec-
tion 3), we seek to improve the scale and longitudinal
duration of privacy policy analysis as well as analysis
techniques.
Dataset. We built a crawler that discovers, down-
loads, and extracts text from privacy policies archived
on the Internet Archive’s Wayback Machine. We used
it to assemble a privacy policy dataset that spans more
than two decades and consists of over one million pri-
vacy policies from over 130,000 websites. The key chal-
lenge we faced was to automatically find privacy policy
pages and distinguish them from other superficially sim-
ilar documents at scale. To solve this, we used a two-
step approach. First, we developed a set of heuristics
aimed at downloading candidate privacy policies with
high recall. The heuristics were based on manual anal-
ysis of hundreds of policies across several failure and
success cases of our crawler. Next, to filter out non-
privacy policies, we built a random forest classifier that
achieves 98% precision and 93% recall. We describe a
number of validation and quality control steps we per-
formed throughout this process (Sections 4, 5, 6).
To make our dataset more accessible to researchers,
regulators, and journalists, we developed a tool to com-
pare different versions of a privacy policy and observe
their evolution. The tool leverages GitHub’s built-in
change-tracking abilities and offers an easy-to-use in-
terface.
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Longitudinal analysis.We use our dataset to con-
duct what is, to our knowledge, the longest-spanning
and largest longitudinal analysis of privacy policies.
Much of our analysis was guided by an automated
trend detection tool that we developed to identify terms
and concepts that may indicate shifts in the privacy
policy landscape. Prior work has relied on experts to
craft queries to capture such ideas. Our system helped
us identify trends in self-regulatory organizations, third
parties, tracking technologies, and regulations.
Our findings further undermine the idea that users
make (or can make) informed decisions based on the
information disclosed in privacy policies. First, we find
that over the last 20 years, privacy policies have become
substantially longer—with a median length of 1,522
words in 2019—and moderately less readable, with the
median policy being at a college reading level. Websites
that are more popular have even less readable policies.
Second, we find that more than 20% of websites have
a privacy policy that links to one or more additional
privacy policies. This means that if a user wanted to
fully understand the policy of such a website, they would
need to read additional policies, further increasing an
already large burden on users.
Third, we find that far fewer privacy policies men-
tion advanced tracking technologies (such as canvas fin-
gerprinting) and third parties (such as DoubleClick)
compared the known prevalence of those technologies
and third parties from prior studies.
Fourth, we find that although a substantial fraction
of privacy policies are responsive to the introduction of
regulations such as GDPR and CalOPPA, companies
are also slow to remove outdated language, such as the
EU-US Safe Harbor agreement that was overturned in
2015.
We hope that our dataset will allow researchers to
examine how past regulations, agreements, court cases,
and industry initiatives have shaped the privacy policy
landscape. Understanding the impacts of past actions
can help drive evidence-based methods for creating im-
pactful privacy policy legislation. Our analyses repre-
sent a first step in this direction.
2 Legal background
In this section, we review the evolving legal context for
privacy policies in the United States and the European
Union, since we aim to examine how privacy policies
respond to legislative and regulatory developments.
Since the early days of the commercial internet, pri-
vacy policies have had a hotly contested role in protect-
ing user information. In the United States, voluntary
disclosures about data practices by companies in their
privacy policies are the foundation of the federal “notice
and choice” approach to consumer privacy. The Euro-
pean Union has taken a different direction, by specifying
what should be included in privacy policies as part of its
more comprehensive approach to data protection regu-
lation. Because our dataset covers most of the period
when online privacy policies have existed, we can assess
how firms have responded to the ongoing debates about
the utility of such policies.
Privacy policies in the United States: notice
and choice. In the mid-1990s, U.S. policymakers faced
a fundamental question about how to regulate privacy
online. They could directly regulate data practices or
they could leave it to the market to protect privacy.
But given evidence that market forces were failing to
protect privacy and that this might be affecting eco-
nomic growth, policymakers landed on a hybrid model.
Their self-regulatory model relied on a system of volun-
tary disclosures that were policed by the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) for accuracy [2]. The FTC’s enforce-
ment actions, which usually result in settlements with
consent decrees, were meant to create an informal com-
mon law around best practices for privacy policies [3].
The underlying theory behind the policy rested on
“the fundamental precepts of awareness and choice” [4].
Specifically, that “Data-gatherers should inform con-
sumers what information they are collecting, and how
they intend to use such data; and Data-gatherers should
provide consumers with a meaningful way to limit
use and re-use of personal information” [4]. Lurking
in the background was the threat that policymakers
would take direct action to protect privacy if the self-
regulatory model failed. Additionally, lawmakers passed
specific legislation to require disclosures about data
practices in certain sectors including healthcare (the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act)
and finance (the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act).
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act
of 1998. Protecting children’s privacy was the first
internet-specific area to be directly regulated. In 1998,
the FTC conducted a study that led it to recommended
legislation to protect children’s privacy by placing par-
ents in control of their information and put industry
on notice that it had to make significant progress on
its self-regulatory efforts. Congress promptly passed the
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) in
1998 to regulate the collection and use of information
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of websites directed at children under 13 years of age.
COPPA’s passage and the threat of further regulation
led to the adoption of privacy policies on many popular
websites.
California Online Privacy Protection Act of
2003. Frustrated by the lack of adequate federal regula-
tion, states started to pass their own laws to protect per-
sonal information. For example, in 2003, California en-
acted its Online Privacy Protection Act (CalOPPA). As
California is the home jurisdiction of many prominent
online services and has a large population of internet
users, its regulations carry significant weight for large
commercial sites. CalOPPA required sites that served
content to California residents to post privacy policies.
The law also specified the minimum content require-
ments for the privacy policies and a process for a user
to review and request changes to information collected
about themselves.
California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018. In
2018, California overhauled its privacy laws through the
California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA). The law,
which took effect on January 1, 2020, gives California
residents more information and control over how their
personal information is being used, and requires busi-
nesses to be more transparent about how they handle
that information. The enforcement of CCPA is left to
the California Attorney General.
Privacy policies in the European Union: data
protection. The European approach has regulators
taking a more direct role in specifying what compa-
nies should disclose in their privacy policies and holding
them accountable for their data practices.
In 1998, the European Union’s (EU) Data Protec-
tion Directive went into effect, which required its mem-
ber states to establish comprehensive privacy regimes
that gave EU citizens broad opt-out rights and specific
protections to control sensitive data, including informa-
tion about religious beliefs, sexual orientation, medical
history, and financial circumstances. These rights were
enforced through specialized data protection authorities
in the individual countries.
General Data Protection Regulation. In 2016,
the EU overhauled its approach to protecting privacy
by passing the General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR). The GDPR builds on the Data Protection Di-
rective and vastly expands the scope of enforcement au-
thority. Some privacy scholars have called it the “most
consequential regulatory development in information
policy in a generation” [5]. As it applies to privacy poli-
cies, the GDPR makes significant changes to the data
protection framework. Article 12 specifies that the con-
troller shall provide required disclosures “in a concise,
transparent, intelligible and easily accessible form, us-
ing clear and plain language.” And Article 7 specifies
that consent must be “freely given” and presented “in
an intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and
plain language.”
Safe Harbor and Privacy Shield. For data that
was collected through websites operating outside Eu-
rope, the EU entered into a series of “Safe Harbor”
agreements that aimed to offer EU citizens an equivalent
degree of protection. Such an agreement was reached
with the U.S. in 2000, which allowed U.S. companies
doing business in Europe to export personal data on
EU citizens. The European Commission agreed that the
American combination of self-regulation through volun-
tary disclosures in privacy policies and FTC enforce-
ment for failures to adhere to those representations were
equivalent to the EU’s comprehensive privacy regula-
tory system. In 2015, however, the European Court of
Justice invalidated the EU-U.S. Safe Harbor Agreement
because the protections were not equivalent to those of-
fered in Europe [6].
In 2016, the European Commission also reached an
agreement with its counterparts in the U.S. to develop
the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield Framework. The goal of this
framework was to enable data transfers under EU law to
U.S.-based businesses. To join the Privacy Shield Frame-
work, a U.S. firm needs to self-certify and publicly com-
mit to comply with the Framework’s requirements. Once
it voluntarily commits, those commitments become en-
forceable under the law through the FTC Act that give
the FTC authority to police public representations for
truthfulness [7].
3 Related work
Increasing adoption of privacy policies and changes in
the regulatory environment have led to a rich research
literature. We briefly synthesize several strands of study
that relate to this project.
Marketplace and longitudinal studies. The
earliest work on privacy policies consisted of market-
place surveys. A sequence of studies by the FTC [8, 9]
and Culnan [10], from 1998 to 2000, found that U.S.
websites were rapidly adopting privacy policies but that
the content of policies was often spotty. In the U.K.,
a 2002 Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) study
reported similar results [11]. More recent surveys have
called attention to privacy policy shortcomings in spe-
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cific sectors, such as healthcare [12] and finance [13]. In
a market survey concurrent to this project, Srinath et
al. report readability scores, topic models, key phrases,
and textual similarity for a corpus of just over a million
privacy policies [14].
Several projects have expressly incorporated a lon-
gitudinal dimension. Milne and Culnan compared data
from a set of marketplace surveys between 1998 and
2001, concluding that privacy policy adoption was in-
creasing and that policies were including greater dis-
closures about collection, sharing, choice, security, and
cookies [15]. In follow-on work, Milne et al. compared a
sample of privacy policies from 2001 and 2003, finding
that readability was decreasing and length was increas-
ing [16]. Antón et. al examined a small number of health-
care privacy policies between 2000 and 2003, observing
similarly decreased readability and greater disclosures
[17].
Recent work has used longitudinal privacy policy
analysis to examine the effects of the GDPR. Degeling
et al. used crawl data from 2018 and Wayback Machine
data from 2016 and 2017 to examine privacy policies on
over 6,000 websites before and after the GDPR took
effect; the findings include a slight uptick in privacy
policy adoption, increased use of key phrases related to
the GDPR, and inconsistent privacy policy update prac-
tices [18]. Linden et al. evaluated a privacy policy corpus
of similar size, using Wayback Machine snapshots from
2016 and 2019, and found that privacy policies were
longer, more likely to include categories of disclosures,
and generally included more specific disclosures [19].
We contribute to this area of literature with a lon-
gitudinal analysis of much larger scope, both in time
(spanning over two decades) and in number of websites
(over 130,000). We characterize longer-term document-
level trends than the prior work, characterize trends
by website popularity, and contextualize shifts associ-
ated with the GDPR (Section 7). We also provide the
first longitudinal analysis of specific trends, including
advanced tracking technologies, third-party online ser-
vices, and claimed regulatory and self-regulatory com-
pliance (Section 8).
Research Datasets. Another thread in the pri-
vacy policy literature is developing privacy policy re-
search datasets for enabling future study. Ramanath
et al. contributed the earliest dataset in 2014, a col-
lection of over 1,000 manually segmented privacy poli-
cies [20]. In 2016, Wilson et al. released OPP-115, a
set of 115 manually annotated website privacy policies
[21]. Companion work by Wilson et al. demonstrated
the feasibility of crowdsourcing to annotate a privacy
policy dataset [22]. In 2019, Zimmeck et al. contributed
APP-350, a dataset of 350 annotated mobile app pri-
vacy policies, and MAPS, a dataset of nearly 450,000
app privacy policy URLs [23]. Concurrent to this work,
Srinath et al. contribute PrivaSeer, a dataset of over
1 million English privacy policies extracted from May
2019 Common Crawl data [14].
Our work advances this area of the privacy policy
literature by providing what is, to our knowledge, the
first longitudinal dataset. We enable future work on pri-
vacy policy analysis to examine trends over time, by ap-
plying new techniques not only to current privacy poli-
cies but also to our curated dataset of historical policies.
Compliance Checking. A separate strand of re-
search has examined whether privacy policies are in
compliance with legal requirements and whether policies
fully disclose data practices (regardless of legal require-
ments). Several projects have compared privacy poli-
cies to data flows and app permissions, noting pervasive
gaps in disclosures [23, 24]. Linden et al. compared pre-
and post-GDPR privacy policies to ICO guidance and
found improving though inconsistent compliance [19]. In
the compliance work most similar to our own, Marotta-
Wurgler examined nearly 250 privacy policies in 2016 for
claims of compliance with regulatory and self-regulatory
programs [25].
We contribute to the privacy policy compliance lit-
erature by evaluating representations about regulatory
and self-regulatory programs over time. We identify
the long-term rise of specific self-regulatory programs,
and we identify shifting representations about regula-
tory programs in response to legal developments (Sec-
tion 8.2). We also compare aggregate privacy policy dis-
closures about advanced tracking technologies to the
known level of adoption of those technologies (Section
8.2).
Consumer Comprehension. Another line of pri-
vacy policy research examines consumer comprehen-
sion. Surveys and intervention studies have demon-
strated that consumers inconsistently read privacy poli-
cies and primarily read privacy policies to exercise con-
trol [26]; consumer trust in websites has little connec-
tion to their privacy policies [27]; consumers have lim-
ited comprehension of privacy policy content [28, 29];
consumers interpret privacy policies differently from le-
gal experts [30, 31]; consumers interpret both precise
and ambiguous privacy policies to provide broad lat-
itude to websites [31]; and consumers have difficulty
exercising privacy choices in privacy policies [32]. The
work closest to our own evaluates consumer compre-
hension through textual analysis. Studies have repeat-
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edly shown that privacy policies are lengthy and dif-
ficult to read [1, 33–35]. While the precise readability
metrics vary by project, recent work has demonstrated
that these metrics are strongly correlated for privacy
policies [35]. Textual analysis has also highlighted the
prevalence of ambiguous claims in privacy policies [36].
We advance the literature on consumer comprehen-
sion of privacy policies by tracking how length and read-
ability have evolved over two decades and across web-
site ranking tiers. We find a steady increase in length,
especially for popular websites (Section 7). We also find
a steady (though modest) decline in readability, with
the effect predominantly among more popular websites
(Section 7).
Applied Machine Learning. A final related area
of the privacy policy literature applies machine learn-
ing techniques to natural language privacy policy texts.
Recent work has identified specific claims in policies
and assigned overall grades [37], identified choices pro-
vided in privacy policies [38, 39], enabled structured and
free-form queries about privacy policy attributes [40].
While our own privacy policy analysis relies on heuris-
tics rather than machine learning, the dataset we con-
tribute is intended to enable future machine learning
projects to easily present longitudinal results.
4 Collecting historical privacy
policies
Privacy policies are intended for human readers, and
automating the process of locating the policies and ex-
tracting their text is challenging. A further complica-
tion is the historical dimension: our goal is to extract
privacy policies of websites that may not exist today.
In this section, we explain how we addressed these chal-
lenges. Figure 1 shows an overview of our data collection
pipeline.
4.1 Building the list of websites
We began by identifying a set of websites to include
in our data collection process. We chose websites that
appeared in the Alexa top 100K list between 2009 and
2019. We considered 100K websites to be sufficient to
reach into the long tail of the web, yet not so numerous
as to pose computational challenges for data collection
or analysis.
Next, we selected a method for discretizing time
windows in our longitudinal dataset. We struck a trade-
off between enabling granular analysis and limiting com-
putational and storage requirements. For each website,
we retrieved two snapshots per year: one snapshot from
the first half of the year (January-June), and one from
the second half (July-December). We call these six-
month spans intervals and use them as the basic time
unit of our data collection and analysis. We refer to the
first interval in a year as “A” and the second as “B”,
so the first half of 2005 is “2005A”. For each interval,
we used the daily archives of Alexa top million list [41]
to retrieve the Alexa rankings closest to the interval’s
midpoint: either 31 March (A) or 30 September (B).
We collected the Alexa ranks for each interval from the
beginning of Alexa’s publication in 2009 to 2019. We ob-
tained 541,616 websites by combining all domains that
appear in the top 100K of these 22 Alexa lists (two lists
per year for 11 years).
4.2 Building the list of snapshots
Next, we determined the list of homepage snapshots
available on the Wayback Machine. We queried the CDX
Server API [42] to retrieve the list of available snapshots
for each site. When a website had multiple snapshots in
a six-month interval, we picked the snapshot closest to
the middle point of the interval. We did not restrict
queries to a time window when searching for snapshots.
For instance, if example.com was only listed in the Alexa
top 100K in 2019, we would include its snapshots from
any other year including as early as 1996, the first year
for which Internet Archive has crawls [43]. We obtained
a list of 9,608,483 homepage snapshots for 523,858 of
the 541,616 websites (96.7%) through our queries.
4.3 Downloading privacy policies
To download archived privacy policies, we built a cus-
tom crawler that uses Pyppeteer under the hood [44]. We
preferred Pyppeteer to Selenium, because Selenium does
not expose HTTP response status codes [45], which we
used to exclude error pages from our crawls. Moreover,
we avoided using Waybackpack [46] or similar libraries
that are not JavaScript-enabled as they may not cor-
rectly capture websites that use JavaScript to populate
link addresses or lay out the page content.
Language detection. We limited ourselves to pri-
vacy policies in English, because our work is moti-
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Fig. 1. Overview of the data collection steps.
vated by U.S. and EU developments and because eval-
uating privacy policies in other languages would re-
quire additional language proficiency. To exclude non-
English websites from our crawls, we ran a language
detection crawl that loaded the most recent homepage
snapshot of each website, extracted the page text (us-
ing document.body.innerText) and identified the lan-
guage of the extracted text using the Polyglot Python
library [47]. If the latest snapshot failed to load, we tried
to visit up to three random homepage snapshots to iden-
tify the site’s language. We identified 280,798 English
websites (5,223,228 snapshots), and discarded the re-
maining 243,060 websites. Of the discarded websites, a
different language was detected on 223,690 (92%), and
no language could be detected on 19,370 websites (8%),
either because the snapshots did not load or because
the text was too short for the Polyglot library to reli-
ably detect the language.
Loading the homepage snapshot. To download
archived privacy policies, we first loaded the homepage
snapshot and ran a language check to make sure the
snapshot is in English. Checking each snapshot’s lan-
guage was necessary since websites may switch lan-
guages due to changing of ownership or start offering
services in more languages. Second, in certain cases, the
Wayback Machine redirected our crawler from the snap-
shot we wanted to visit to another snapshot of the same
page — perhaps due to an availability issue with the
original snapshot. In those cases, we checked the times-
tamp of the new snapshot and aborted the crawl if the
new snapshot was not in the same six-month interval
as the original snapshot. Third, we aborted visits where
the crawler attempted to load the live (non-archived)
version of the page due to a redirection. Fourth, we mon-
itored all requests that the crawler made and blocked re-
quests that attempted to fetch resources from live web-
sites. Finally, we aborted requests that fetched images
to minimize our bandwidth footprint on the Wayback
Machine servers.
Privacy policy link detection. Privacy policy
links may be worded in various ways (such as Pri-
vacy Policy, Your Privacy, or Click here for the pri-
vacy policy), or point to different URL paths such as
/privacy.html, /privacy.php or /page=123. We chose
to use link texts—that is, the clickable text appear-
ing within the <a> element—to detect privacy policy
links over other link features such as the URL path.
Link texts are expected to be recognizable by users, and
therefore more likely to contain certain keywords.
The policy link detection was based on a two-step
method: first, we extracted all HTML <a> elements from
the DOM and searched for links with link texts that ex-
actly matched one of the following strings: “privacy pol-
icy”, “privacy statement”, “privacy”, “privacy notice”,
“cookie policy”, “your privacy”, “your privacy rights.”
If this search failed, we searched for links that con-
tained the term “privacy” and one of the following terms
in their link text: “policy”, “policies”, “cookie”, “secu-
rity”, “statement”, “terms”, “notice.” We compiled these
terms based on prior research [48] and adding other
terms by manually analyzing a sample of 100 pages
where we did not find a privacy policy link in a pi-
lot crawl. The manual analysis of these pages involved
searching for privacy policy links and checking whether
the linked page’s title, headers and content describe a
privacy policy or not.
The link detection method is designed to be com-
prehensive and may lead to pages that do not contain
actual privacy policies. For instance, our search terms
may be used to link to blog posts tagged with the “Pri-
vacy” label. We detect and remove these false positives
after the crawl, using a classifier that distinguishes pri-
vacy policies from other pages (Section 5).
Policy download. For each detected privacy policy
link, we queried the Wayback Machine CDX API to
retrieve the list of snapshots that are in the same time
interval as the homepage snapshot. Then we followed
one of two paths, depending on the predicted file type
of the policy. If a URL ended in “.pdf”, we used the
Python requests library [49] to retrieve the document.
If a URL did not end in “.pdf,” we loaded the policy
snapshot URL using the Pyppeteer-based crawler and
ran a final language check to eliminate the non-English
policies.
Boilerplate removal and text extraction. If we
were to extract all text from policy pages, we would end
up with boilerplate unrelated text from sidebars, footers
and headers. We removed boilerplate and extracted the
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main article from the page’s DOM using the standalone
version of Mozilla’s Readability library [50]. Next, we
extracted Markdown formatted text from the readable
policy web page using the html2text Python library [51].
Markdown formatting allowed us to retain the links and
basic document structure such as headers and lists, with
minimal markup overhead.
4.4 Practical and ethical considerations
We made sure that Internet Archive’s terms of use do
not prohibit automated access. Prior to starting our
crawls, we sent an email to the IA’s contact address
to notify them of our study. We note that several other
studies used Wayback Machine in the past [52–55],
We took steps to minimize any adverse impact of
our crawl on the Wayback Machine’s servers. To reduce
our bandwidth footprint, we disabled image downloads
and limited the number of parallel crawl workers to 256.
We slowed down our crawls by pausing the workers when
they received HTTP 429 (“Too Many Requests”) or
HTTP 503 (“503 Service Unavailable”) errors from the
Wayback Machine servers. After starting the crawl, we
monitored the Wayback Machine server load stats [56]
to ensure that we were not imposing a significant load.
4.5 Failure analysis
We started from 5,223,228 homepage snapshots, and our
crawler was able to download 1,292,420 privacy policy
snapshots (24%). Downloads of privacy policies corre-
sponding to the other 3,930,808 homepage snapshots
failed due to various causes which we list in Table 1 and
break down below.
By far the most common cause is the failure to
find a privacy policy link on the archived homepage:
in 2,336,849 visits (44.7% of all snapshots) the crawler
could load the archived homepage, but could not find a
policy link. This is followed by blank homepages, that
is, pages from which we could not extract any text;
they account for 383,337 or 7.3% of the failed visits. Al-
though we eliminated non-English sites before the crawl,
310,563 homepage snapshots (5.9%) were classified as
non-English—perhaps due to false negatives in our lan-
guage detection, changing of website ownership, or web-
sites starting to offer services in multiple languages.
When our crawler does not find a policy link or de-
tects a blank page, this may be due to a problem with
the page (e.g., no policy published, the page has no con-
Failure cause Count Percent
No privacy policy link found on homepage 2,336,849 44.7%
Homepage detected as blank 383,337 7.3%
Non-English homepage 310,563 5.9%
Policy page is not archived in this interval 271,736 5.2%
Out-of-interval redirection for homepage 158,727 3.0%
Table 1. The five most common causes of failure to download
privacy policies. Out-of-interval redirection (row 5) means our
crawler was redirected to a snapshot in a different interval.
tent) or the crawler (e.g., link detection or text extrac-
tion failed). To investigate the root causes of the fail-
ures, we manually analyzed 100 random snapshots for
each of the most common crawl failures in Appendix B.
The main takeaways from the manual analysis are as
follows: only four of the 100 pages where we could not
detect a policy link actually had a privacy policy link
on their homepage. We missed these links due to a link
term that we did not search for. Only three of the 100
homepages detected as blank contained a privacy policy
link, while 13 of them contained some text in a separate
frame (using the obsolete frameset element). The lat-
ter indicates that designs and markups of older pages
make it relatively difficult for the crawler to interact
with the page. We further explore the relation between
the snapshot age and crawl success in Section 6.1.
To sum up, overwhelming majority of the failures
were due to snapshots that did not contain a policy link,
were not archived by the Wayback Machine, or were in
a non-English language. The missing policies that can
be attributed to the limitations of the crawler is 2% of
all snapshots (4% of 44.7% + 3% of 7.3%) if we consider
privacy policies we intended to find.
5 Filtering the corpus
We collected a total of ∼1.29M web pages through the
crawl steps. In order to filter out web pages that are
not privacy policies, we trained a classifier on manually
labeled data from the candidate policies. In this section,
we refer to the text of the crawled web pages extracted
with html2text as “documents.”
5.1 What constitutes a privacy policy
One way to define what constitutes a privacy policy is
based on legal requirements. For example, under the
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GDPR, a privacy policy must explain how online ser-
vices process and protect the collected information, and
who has access to it. We did not adopt a definition based
on legal requirements, as we considered it infeasible to
train a classifier to accurately decide whether a doc-
ument satisfies such requirements. Additionally, differ-
ent jurisdictions have different legal requirements, and
it would not be clear which ones we should adopt. Fur-
ther, excluding non-compliant policies would limit the
usefulness of our dataset.
Instead, we aimed to identify documents that were
represented as privacy policies by the respective web-
sites. Specifically, a document is a privacy policy if it
meets all of the following criteria:
– It is linked from the home page with a link text
that contains one of the substrings (“privacy pol-
icy”, “privacy statement”, etc.) defined in Section
4.3.
– It is a legal document and is about privacy. The pre-
vious heuristic is designed to maximize recall rather
than precision; we found that it often retrieves doc-
uments that are related to privacy but not a privacy
policy, such as blog posts about privacy.
– It does not meet any of the exclusion criteria listed
in Appendix E. These criteria are designed to filter
out documents that are related to privacy policies
but which we determined should not be included in
our corpus for various reasons.
We adopted this definition for manual labeling, and
our classifier is designed to filter our corpus based on
these criteria.
5.2 Labeling the sample
We started by manually labeling a sample of candidate
policies. First, we sampled a random subset of docu-
ments and labeled 1,139 of them. In the sample, the
majority of the documents was obtained by crawling for
the link text pattern “privacy + policy” (as described in
Section 4.3). We additionally sampled 50 random doc-
uments for each of the six remaining link text patterns
so as to reduce overrepresentation of the first matching
link pattern.
Two researchers independently labeled a sample of
100 randomly collected documents using the criteria
above. The inter-annotator agreement was κ = 0.93.
Our final labeled dataset contains ∼81.5% (1173) posi-
tives and ∼18.5% (266) negatives.
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Fig. 2. Mean area under the curve (AUC) of the random forest
classifier for whether a web page is a privacy policy.
5.3 Converting documents to features
We cleaned the documents by removing Markdown tags
and retaining inner text. We then removed symbols and
the set of English stop words in scikit-learn [57]. Then,
we created word n-gram tokens spanning from unigrams
to 4-grams and generated features based on the fre-
quency of occurrence of each token. We excluded tokens
that appeared in fewer than 1% of the documents.
We also extracted features from document titles,
parsing them from the HTML <title> tag.
In PDF files, we obtained titles by using pdftitle [58].
We removed symbols and stop words from the titles and
we generated features based on the number of occur-
rences of each unigram in the title. We excluded tokens
that appeared in fewer than 1% of the documents.
Finally, we extracted features from several different
sources, including the link text and the document URL.
However, as we describe in the following section, the
best model we found was given by features extracted
exclusively from document text and titles.
5.4 Model training and validation
We expected that a large portion of the crawled candi-
date policies would indeed be privacy policies according
to our criteria. We sought to obtain a classification de-
cision boundary that would guarantee a high quality
in our final dataset. Therefore, we prioritized precision
over recall to discard a high percentage of documents
that do not fit our criteria.
We used 10-fold cross validation for model selec-
tion, including comparing between model families and
tuning hyperparameters. We selected hyperparameters
that would decrease our chances to overfit our model.
For example, we set a maximum depth to the decision
trees to lower the maximum complexity of the model.
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Additionally, we sought to increase our model’s perfor-
mance in the presence of an unbalanced dataset such as
ours by assigning class weights to be inversely propor-
tional to class frequencies.
We evaluated two models, random forest and logis-
tic regression, on the average area under the Receiver
Operator Characteristics curve (AUC ), which is a good
predictor of the performance of a classifier with an un-
balanced dataset. We selected random forest based on
its higher AUC (97% vs. 95%). Additionally, we evalu-
ated several classification thresholds on their precision-
recall balance.
5.5 Classification and evaluation
Approximately 17% (220,932) of the documents in
the dataset were classified as negatives, with the final
dataset totaling 1,071,488 policies. We discuss the re-
lease of this data in Section 9.
We manually classified a held-out set of 749 random
samples using the criteria in Section 5.2. The held-out
set consisted of 651 positives and 98 negatives (ground
truth). The performance of the final model on the held-
out set is shown in Figure 2.
The chosen classification threshold resulted in
97.9% precision and 94.2% recall. Specifically, we found
13 false positives out of 626 predicted positives and 38
false negatives out of 123 predicted negatives. In partic-
ular, almost all the false positives (12 out of 13) are hy-
brid documents that contain a privacy policy and terms
of use or terms of service; the remaining false positive
is a summary of a privacy policy which contains link to
the full policy. The majority of false negatives (21 out
of 38) are short policies under 200 words. Short policies
are not as common in the held-out set, which has a me-
dian text length of 925 words with a standard deviation
of around 1120.
5.6 Building the analysis subcorpus
In order to ensure the quality of our analysis, we purged
additional, real policies from our dataset that might lead
to a biased analysis. We removed duplicate policies hav-
ing the same URL, policies from parked domains, and
policies from websites that redirected from their home-
page to a different domain. We call the resulting corpus
the “analysis subcorpus.” In sections 6, 7, and 8 we use
the analysis subcorpus for our analyses.1
As our dataset spans more than 20 years, many do-
mains have expired. In some cases, expired domains
are bought by companies that park these domains
for traffic monetization. We found that privacy poli-
cies of the parking services such as godaddy.com and
hugedomains.com are abundant in our dataset as they
hosted privacy policies of 7,092 and 2,275 distinct do-
mains, respectively. To remove these policies, we used
lists of domain parking services and registrars from
prior research [59–62], and the ICANN-Accredited Reg-
istrars list [63]. Following the method described in Ap-
pendix A we detected 79 parking providers and resellers
and removed 24,289 (2.3%) snapshots hosted by these
providers.
In order to ensure our metadata for a policy is per-
tinent, we removed policy snapshots with a cross-origin
homepage redirection (COHR). For example, consider
that a.com redirects to b.com. Our crawler would ex-
tract and download the policy link on b.com, but store
the downloaded policy with a.com’s metadata such as
Alexa rank and category. This would jeopardize the
quality of our metadata, unless both sites were owned by
the same entity. Thus we removed COHR policy snap-
shots, but we made an exception for websites that have
similar domain names, as this may indicate that they
are owned by the same organization. Specifically, we did
not remove redirections where the domain names have a
common label [64], that is, part of the domain name sep-
arated by dots. We excluded the top level domain name
such as “co.uk” from this comparison, as well as labels
that are shorter than two characters. For example, we
retained the policy snapshot from docusign.net, which
redirects to docusign.com, since the “docusign” label is
common in both domains. We removed 75,432 snapshots
due to COHR, and retained 11,484 snapshots based on
the common-label exception.
Finally, to remove duplicates, we followed Degeling
et al.’s example to remove duplicates based on URLs.
Specifically, any time two or more sites share a pol-
icy URL during the same interval, we remove all but
one, keeping the first party when possible. We removed
61,220 policies due to this rule.
1 While we removed this data for our analyses, we anticipate
that there may be some research questions that would bene-
fit from their inclusion. Accordingly, in our public release, we
include both the full corpus and the subcorpus.
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In total, we removed 160,941 policies using the
methods described above, leaving us with 910,546 poli-
cies from 108,499 sites.
6 Privacy policy corpus
In order to understand the structure and biases of the
data, we discuss the dataset composition, and we exam-
ine the types and causes of missing data.
6.1 Corpus overview
Our dataset contains 910,546 policies from 108,499 dif-
ferent websites. On average, a website has 8.4 policy
snapshots (median=6). Although the dataset contains
policies from as early as 1997, 79.4% of the policies are
from snapshots archived in 2010 or later. Table 2 shows
the number of homepage snapshots and privacy poli-
cies in the analysis subcorpus. As we briefly explored in
Section 4.5, the rate of successful downloads from ear-
lier snapshots is significantly lower for a combination of
reasons including inaccessible website design and non-
standard markup.
Figure 3 shows the number of privacy policies and
homepage snapshots per interval. The decreases in the
number of policies in 2009B and 2018A also occur in
the number of homepage snapshots in those intervals,
indicating that these decreases may be due to changes
in archiving or incomplete archives for those intervals.
Distribution of website categories.We examine
the website categories for which we have the best cover-
age. We collected category data from Webshrinker [65],
which provides a domain category lookup API. We also
Years Homepage snapshots Privacy policies %
1997-1999 83,375 780 0.81
2000-2009 1,333,306 186,823 12.6
2010-2019 3,808,513 722,943 19.1
Table 2. Rate of successful privacy downloads per year ranges,
based on privacy policies in the analysis subcorpus.
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Fig. 4. The distribution of website categories for present and
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egories for English language websites. Policies which belong to
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no listed categories are added to the “uncategorized” category.
collected a small sample of category data from Alexa
Web Information Services [66], but we found the data
to be sparse compared to Webshrinker.Because category
data is not available historically from Webshrinker, we
made the assumption that categories are constant across
time. We collected category data for the 108,499 web-
sites in our dataset and the 150,192 websites with En-
glish homepages that were at one point in the Alexa Top
100k. Figure 4 shows the distribution of categories for
both present and absent sites. While we capture 40%
or more for most categories, just a few categories domi-
nate both our dataset, and the English websites at large.
On the other hand, uncategorized websites and illegal
content2 are strongly underrepresented in our dataset.
Distribution of snapshot Alexa ranks. The dis-
tribution of homepages and snapshots by Alexa rank
is shown in Table 3. The snapshots are roughly evenly
2 “Illegal content” contains copyright-infringing content [67].
Other types of unlawful content are contained in categories un-
der “Other”.
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Alexa ranks Homepage snapshots Privacy policies %
(1, 1K] 13,455 5,003 37.2
(1K, 10K] 104,801 38,959 37.2
(10K, 100K] 980,928 278,324 28.4
(100K, 1M] 1,339,157 319,866 23.9
>1M 2,786,853 268,394 9.6
Table 3. Rate of successful privacy downloads per Alexa rank
buckets – based on privacy policies in the analysis subcorpus.
distributed across the 10K-100K, 10K-100K, and >1M
bins. The >1M bin contains snapshots for which we do
not have an Alexa rank, either because they were not
listed in the Alexa top 1M or were captured before 2009.
We have 5,003 snapshots from the top 1K and 38,959
snapshots from the 1K-10K range.
While the majority of our policies come from web-
sites with rank 100k and up, the success rate of obtain-
ing policy is much higher if the website is in the top
10k.
Missing data In Appendix C, we we categorize the
missing data in our dataset and different factors that
affect missingness.
7 Document-level trends
In order to understand how privacy policies have
changed at a macroscopic level, we examine how length,
readability, and updates have changed over time. For
analyses where we break down our findings by website
popularity, we restrict them to the years 2009-2019 be-
cause that is the range for which we have Alexa rank
data.
Policy length. Figures 5a and 5b show the change
in policy length as measured by word count. We see
that the median word count has increased gradually
over time—doubling between 2009A and 2019B—and
more sharply in recent years, after the introduction of
the GDPR; this trend holds for both popular and less
popular websites. But the median hides a substantial
variance: the 5th percentile for word length is 248 words
and the 95th percentile is 3404 words. Our findings are
roughly consistent with a 2005 measurement of the top
75 websites by McDonald et al.[1].
Readability. It is well known that privacy policies
are difficult to read [1, 16, 34, 35]. Here we examine how
readability has changed over time.
We measured readability scores with a Flesch-
Kincaid grade level (FKGL) [68], a SMOG grade
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Fig. 5. Word count.
level [69], and a Flesch reading ease [70] using the py-
readability-metrics Python library [71]. In order to mea-
sure readability, we first had to perform some prepro-
cessing steps. We removed non-sentence text such as
headers, tables, and lists by writing a custom Markdown
renderer using the Mistune [72] Python library.
All three readability metrics showed a similar trend;
we show the FKGL measurements in Figures 6. The
average readability score has risen from around 12 to
around 13 over 20 years, corresponding to a college level.
More popular websites have less readable policies.
Privacy policy updates Websites may update
their privacy policies to reflect changes in how they pro-
cess data and respond to new regulatory requirements,
among other reasons. We follow Linden et al. to limit
our analysis to significant updates, where the fuzzy sim-
ilarity ratio [73] of the current and the previous version
of the policy is less than or equal to 95%.
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Figure 7 shows that popular websites update their
policies more frequently.The GDPR appears to have
caused a major uptick across all rank buckets. This is
even more apparent in Figure 8, where we plot the per-
centage of unchanged lines (measured using the difflib
Python module [74]).
8 Trends in terminology
We sought to understand how the language of privacy
policies has shifted. While prior research used manually
crafted keywords to analyze trends [18], we developed
a trend detection system that identify key terms that
experts might otherwise overlook.
8.1 Automated trend detection
We first sought to identify trends in an automated fash-
ion, to help ensure we are able to perform a compre-
hensive analysis of the historical privacy policy land-
scape. To do this, we built a pipeline to further clean
and process the data. We started by replacing cer-
tain patterns—URLs, named entities, numbers, and
emails—in the policies with placeholders. This allows us
to capture cases where a phrase recurs, but, for exam-
ple, an organization name is changed. We then split the
policies into terms—n-grams, sentences, and named en-
tities, and URLs—for which we obtained the document
frequency. Finally, we used a variety of scoring functions
3 We excluded snapshots for which we have a gap in the previ-
ous interval from Figure 7 and Figure 8, since determining the
exact time of the updates was not possible.
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2-grams (Gain) Entities (Pos Slope 2) 2-grams (Pos Slope 2)
service providers (0.27) gdpr (0.12) personal data (0.14)
data protection (0.27) eu (0.11) data protection (0.13)
personal data (0.24) google analytics (0.09) withdraw consent (0.13)
may include (0.24) eea (0.08) processing personal (0.13)
may collect (0.22) facebook (0.07) legitimate interests (0.12)
Table 4. The top five results from three categories of our auto-
mated trend detection tool. The scores in parentheses are deter-
mined as described in Appendix D. Briefly, “Gain” describes the
increase from 2009A to 2019B, and “Pos Slope 2” describes the
maximum increase over any 2-interval period. “Entities” refers
to terms extracted by named entity recognition, as described in
Appendix D.
to identify terms of interest. For example, we measured
the maximum increase a term experiences over any one
or two interval span, and the increase a term experi-
enced overall. We document these scoring functions in
detail in Appendix D.
Results. To showcase the utility of our tool, we
provide some examples of trends that our tool identi-
fied in Table 4. Under 2-grams measured by gain, we
note the growth of terms such as “may include” and
“may collect”, which are terms of ambiguity in privacy
policies, previously studied by Reidenberg et al. [36].
This suggests that privacy policies may be becoming
more ambiguous over time, which should be investigated
in future work. We notice growth in terms related to
European privacy regulation (GDPR, EU, EEA), along
with Google Analytics and Facebook, two commonly
used third-party products/companies. We investigate
this trend and other trends we observed in more depth in
Section 8.2. Furthermore, we notice growth in unigrams
that likely relate to GDPR. In particular, we notice the
term “legitimate interests” growing, which likely refers
to one of the six lawful bases of processing personal data
under the GDPR.
8.2 Trends
After examining the results of our automated trend
detection tool, we chose to investigate trends in four
categories: self-regulatory bodies, tracking technologies,
third parties, and privacy regulations and agreements.
Self-regulatory bodies. In order to examine the
prevalence and evolution of self-regulation in the privacy
policy landscape, we sought to examine their represen-
tation in privacy policies. First, we selected thirteen or-
ganizations to investigate. We selected six privacy seals
from the prior work [75], three industry trade groups,
and four additional privacy seals. We removed seven or-
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Fig. 10. Tracking Technologies. The percentage of policies, after
deduplication, that reference terms related to tracking technolo-
gies. The following terms were excluded due to low frequency:
“cross-device fingerprint”, “JavaScript”, “cross-device”, “flash
cookie/local shared object”. Exact queries are in Appendix Table
6.
ganizations that were never mentioned in at least 1% of
privacy policies. We show the fraction of policies men-
tioning the organization or referencing its domains in
Figure 9.
The graph indicates that privacy seal initiatives
have been only modestly successful at achieving market
penetration, and have not grown their markets signif-
icantly. However, industry-led initiatives like the Net-
work Advertising Initiative (NAI) and Digital Adver-
tising Alliance (DAA) have shown significant growth,
and that growth appears to be continuing. The Eu-
ropean Digital Advertising Alliance (EDAA), another
industry-lead initiative in the EU, also appears to be
showing growth. A possible explanation for these results
is that websites have greater incentive to participate in
government-directed programs designed to forestall reg-
ulation (e.g., NAI, DAA, and EDAA) than in consumer-
directed programs designed to differentiate from com-
petitors and build trust in the online marketplace (e.g.,
TrustArc and BBB).
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Tracking technologies. Tracking technologies are
pervasive in the modern web [76, 77]. If privacy poli-
cies are fully transparent, we would expect that obser-
vations of tracking technologies on the web would match
declarations in privacy policies, so we investigated how
frequently privacy policies disclose the use of tracking
technologies.
We selected eleven terms related to tracking tech-
nologies, which we split into two categories based on
their prevalence in the policies: “tracking technologies”
and “advanced tracking technologies”. We show the his-
tory of the first group in Figure 10, and the history of
the second group in Figure 11. Mentions of “cookie”
are quite close to the observations of the usage of cook-
ies [76, 78]. However, we notice that many advanced
tracking technologies appear to be under-reported. For
example, prior studies found that canvas fingerprinting
is used by 5.7% of the Alexa top 100K sites in 2014 [77]
and 1.6% of the Alexa top 1M sites in in 2016 [76],
whereas fewer than 0.1% of websites mention canvas
fingerprinting in our dataset.
Third parties. Third parties assist in many func-
tions on the web, but tracking is the most prevalent
one [76]. Continuing our investigation of disclosure and
Privacy policy URL # of websites with linking policy
google.com/privacy_ads.html 11,324
google.com/intl/en/policies/privacy 1,690
google.com/policies/privacy 1,421
automattic.com/privacy 948
twitter.com/privacy 931
google.com/privacy.html 873
facebook.com/policy.php 607
google.com/privacypolicy.html 559
mailchimp.com/legal/privacy 528
doubleclick.net/us/corporate/privacy 498
Table 5. Privacy policies that are most linked from the other
privacy policies. The right column indicates the distinct number
of sites.
transparency, we chose to examine how often privacy
policies disclose the prevalence of third parties.
We compiled a list of 20 popular third parties from
other measurements of third parties on the web [52,
76, 79]. We searched for alternative names for the
third party, and domain names owned by the organi-
zation using data from DuckDuckGo’s Tracker Radar
project [79]. We chose the top eight most referenced
third parties in 2019B, which we show in Figure 12. We
find that these third parties are mentioned in privacy
policies far less frequently than they are observed in the
web measurements [76, 79].
The gap between observation and disclosure indi-
cates that many privacy policies may not be disclosing
all present third parties.
Another observation is that reporting of third par-
ties is largely increasing. It is unclear if this is due to
increased presence or increased transparency.
Outbound links. In addition to disclosing third-
party partners, companies may provide links to opt-out
pages, industry organizations, or third-party partners
that they share data with. Analyzing links found in the
privacy policies may reveal trends in third-party data
sharing and the effect of regulation on transparency.
Here we study a specific type of links: links from one
privacy policy to another.
We extracted links from readable HTML sources
and policy texts using the Beautiful Soup Python Li-
brary [80] and regular expressions. We removed mal-
formed links by ensuring the top level domain (TLD) of
the link is an approved TLD [81].
We found that 20.3% of websites link to another
policy. If these links are in a context that requires the
user to read them, a user wishing to read the privacy
policy now faces the double burden of reading both the
first-party policy and the linked policy. We show the
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privacy policy URLs with the most incoming links from
other policies in Table 5.
We can see that six of 10 are from Google. The fact
that Google’s privacy policies are most linked from other
policies is consistent with Englehardt et al.’s observation
that Google is the third party with the largest tracking
presence [76].
The privacy links we observe provide an alternate
explanation to the disparity we observed in our discus-
sion of tracking technologies—specific technologies may
not be named because they are explained in the third
party’s privacy policy—instead of the first party’s. We
suggest further work to look into the disparity between
disclosure and usage.
Regulations and agreements. When self-
regulation is perceived to be unsuccessful, governments
may choose to turn to regulations and cross-border
agreements. We wanted to know how widely regula-
tions and cross-border agreements have impacted pri-
vacy policies.
To understand the impact, we used mentions of
those regulations and agreements to measure whether a
policy has been impacted. We show these results in Fig-
ure 13. We observe that the term GDPR experienced the
most aggressive and rapid adoption raising from 0.1%
from 2017B to 14.8% in 2018A. Mention of other regu-
lation and agreements such as COPPA and the Privacy
Shield frameworks also show similar levels of adoption,
albeit slower than GDPR. We note that, while the EU-
U.S. Safe Harbor agreement was overturned in the latter
half of 2015 [6], the decline in mentions was slow, indi-
cating that companies may be slow to remove outdated
language from their privacy policies.
9 Data and software release
Our dataset is available for public use at https://
privacypolicies.cs.princeton.edu/. Prior to publication,
we will release our source code on the same website.
In addition, inspired by the TOSBack project [82],
we took steps to build a chronologically accurate Github
repository of the policy documents. Using a git reposi-
tory and Github’s easy to use web interface may bring
many advantages that will make our corpus more acces-
sible to broader public. Without using any specialized
software, users will be able to perform full text search,
compare different versions of the same policy, or use the
“Blame” feature to find out when a particular line was
added.
We used GitPython [83] to commit privacy pol-
icy texts using the timestamps that reflect the origi-
nal capture date of the policy. We plan to add to the
git commit messages the policy metadata. We have al-
ready built a preliminary historical privacy policy repos-
itory of websites that were ever ranked in the Alexa top
1K (n=1046), and we intend to expand this to our full
dataset.
10 Limitations
Our data collection and analyses are limited to privacy
policies; we do not analyze how archived websites track
users or share personal data with third parties. A longi-
tudinal comparison of website privacy policies to online
tracking practices could be a fruitful research direction,
and may reveal whether websites became more trans-
parent about their data collection practices in time.
For internationalized websites, the location of the
Wayback Machine crawlers could determine the lan-
guage of the archived site and its privacy policy. Al-
though “the vast majority of captures are initiated from
the [United States]”, there is no way to determine the
location, country, or the IP address of the Wayback Ma-
chine crawlers that captured a particular snapshot [84].
For our readability discussion, we note that read-
ability metrics have limitations, and we should be care-
ful about the inferences we draw from them [29]. These
metrics do not consider organization, formatting, or
length of the document, nor do they consider the se-
mantic difficulty of the document.
In our discussion of how terms trend over time,
we used (typically handcrafted) regular expressions to
search for referenced terms. Despite our best efforts,
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these regular expressions may capture terms that we did
not intend to capture. They additionally may capture
terms we intended to capture, but do not fit the targeted
concept, and they may miss terms that fit the targeted
concept. In some cases, terms alone may not be suffi-
cient; for example, a policy might follow the guidelines
of a self-regulatory group, but not mention the name of
the group.
11 Conclusion
We developed a system for the longitudinal, large-scale,
automated collection of privacy policies, which we used
to collect over 1M privacy policies. We used our dataset
to highlight market-level trends and leave the door open
for future work to explore these and other trends fur-
ther.
We expanded on results from prior work by examin-
ing various attributes over a larger time span and com-
pared across Alexa ranks. We found that policy length
has doubled in the last 10 years, while reading difficulty
has grown a full grade level in the last 20 years. We saw
that privacy policies have updated at a fairly steady
rate, with about 25% of the most popular websites up-
dating their privacy policies every 6 months. We also
found that all of these observations are correlated with
Alexa ranking.
We developed an automated trend detection tool,
and we followed some of the threads uncovered by our
tool. Our results suggest that privacy policies show a
concerning lack of transparency: the usage of third par-
ties and tracking technologies is under-reported. We ob-
served that self-regulatory bodies have achieved only
modest market penetration, although industry trade
groups are currently trending towards more adoption.
Based on our results we suggest two research di-
rections: First, the reporting gap for third parties and
tracking technologies can be investigated with a combi-
nation of web measurements and privacy policy analysis.
Second, more sophisticated natural language techniques
applied to longitudinal privacy policy data could im-
prove our understanding of how policies adapt to new
regulations, and which regulations have seen the best
compliance. We expect that our dataset may prove use-
ful for research in both of these directions and other
directions that we have not foreseen.
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Appendix A Parked domain
detection and removal
To remove policies from parked domains we first
collected domain parking providers from prior re-
search [59–62]. Then we considered the 10 registrars
with the most first parties on the ICANN-Accredited
Registrars list [63], from which we manually reviewed
ten samples. We found that six of these showed parked
or expired domain pages, and four did not. We included
the six that showed a parked page. Then we manually
analyzed ten snapshots from the remaining top ten pol-
icy snapshot domains with most websites. We found
that two were used exclusively for hosting domain park-
ing service privacy policies and three were domain park-
ing services or registrars. Our final list consisted of 79
parking providers and resellers.
Appendix B Manual analysis of
crawl failures
We manually labeled 100 policies for each of the follow-
ing conditions, to ensure the quality of our methods:
No privacy policy link found on homepage.
86 did not have a privacy policy anywhere on the site,
based on our best efforts to find it. 4 had a privacy pol-
icy link on their homepage that we could not identify:
1/4 had a JavaScript popup link with an empty href
element; 3/4 used a term that our link detection heuris-
tics missed (e.g., “Legal”). 2 had a policy link but it
was image-based; the link contain no text that we could
match against. 5 had a policy link on a different page
than the homepage. 3 had no privacy policy link but the
terms of service also contained the privacy policy.
Detected as non-English. 99 were non-English.
1 was a mixed language website with some English text.
Detected as English. 97 were only in English. 3
were mixed language with some English text.
Policy page is not archived during interval.
100 were not archived during the given interval.
Blank homepage. 65 were blank, i.e. contained no
image or text. 13 were snapshots (median year=2001)
that contained text, but they used a now obsolete
“<frameset>” element to markup their pages. This
caused our crawler to extract the text that is in a dif-
ferent frame than the top-level document. 19 were sites
that were entirely composed of images, an early design
pattern that lost its popularity due to limited accessibil-
ity. 3 were blank, but redirected to another page after
a certain time; in one case to a live website that our
crawler would block.
Appendix C Missing data
As with many large-scale datasets, our dataset has miss-
ing data that should be considered, both in how it bi-
ases the data and how it affects analysis. There are four
primary possible reasons a snapshot might be missing
from our dataset. First, the website did not exist at
the time. Second, the website existed, but did not have
a privacy policy. Third, the Wayback Machine did not
crawl the homepage or the privacy policy. Finally, our
crawler could not find or download the privacy policy.
The first and second reasons describe data that is
nonexistent, which we still categorize as missing. The
third reason describes incomplete archiving, for example
due to crawl rules from robots.txt. The final reason
describes biases from our crawler and classifier.
Types of missing data. The categorization we
use for the missing data is illustrated in Figure 14. We
categorize the missing data as “absent” and “gap”, and
further break down gaps as “pre-”, “post-” and “mid-
gaps” in the subsections below.
Absent Data. We categorize websites as absent if
we have no privacy policies on any interval for that web-
site. We find that 61.3% of English websites as described
in Section 4.1 are absent. We are more likely to have a
privacy policy for a popular website: 48.8% of the En-
glish websites that have been in the Alexa Top 1k are
absent.
Gaps. We categorize a snapshot as a gap if we do
not have a privacy policy in the snapshot’s interval, but
we do for a different interval for the same website. We
further break down gaps into ‘pre-gaps”, “mid-gaps”
and “post-gaps” as illustrated in Figure 14. Even with
perfect archiving, pre-gaps and post-gaps would still be
expected, as websites come and go. A mid-gap, however,
likely reflects a failure in archiving or collection rather
than a lack of existence. In our dataset, only 14.7% of
snapshots have a mid-gap immediately before them (i.e.
a missing snapshot preceding a present snapshot that
isn’t the first snapshot for that interval), while 54.1% of
websites have at least one mid-gap (i.e. a missing snap-
shot in any interval between the first and last present
snapshots). Longer-lived websites are also more likely
to have gaps—websites for which we have no gaps live
an average 11.2 intervals, compared to 16.5 intervals
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Label Text Query URL Query
BBBOnLine (?:\bBBBOnLine\b|\bBetter\sBusiness\sBureau\b) \bbbb.org\b
DAA (?:\bDAA\b|\bDigital\sAdvertising\sAlliance\b) \b(?:aboutads\.(?:info)|digitaladvertisingalliance.org|youradchoices\.com)
Web Beacon/Bug (?:web\s(?:bug|beacon)|pixel)
Browser/Device Fingerprint (?:browser|device)\sfingerprint
BCR \b(?:BCR|Binding\sCorporate\sRules)\b
Yahoo/AOL (?:\bYahoo\b|\bAOL\b|\bAmerica Online\b) 136 URLs (omitted due to length)
Table 6. A sample of the queries from Section 8.2. URLs for Yahoo/AOL are omitted due to excessive length, but are of the form
\b(?:url1|url2|...)\b
Time
Site C
Pre-gap
Present
Mid-gap
Post-gap
Site B
AbsentSite A
Fig. 14. An illustration of the 4 types of missing data. Here we
have 3 sites: Site A never appears in our dataset; Site B’s first
snapshot appears early and has some missing snapshots; Site C’s
first snapshot appears later, it has some missing snapshots, and
has missing snapshots after its last present snapshot
for websites with gaps. Users of the dataset may con-
sider imputing mid-gaps with a policy from a preceding
or succeeding interval on the same website. The choice
of which interval to draw from, and if imputation is
needed, depends on the particular research question.
Website popularity. We sought to determine if
gaps are biased with respect to Alexa rank. For poten-
tial snapshots with a rank (rank ≤ 1M), we found the
Pearson’s correlation between Alexa rank and a binary
gap variable to be -0.02 for mid-gaps, 0.07 for pre-gaps,
and 0.08 for post-gaps (p < 0.001). Among snapshots
without a rank, just 3.0% of snapshots are mid-gaps,
78.4% are pre-gaps, 11.2% are post-gaps, leaving just
7.3% of snapshots present. As we can see, mid-gaps do
not seem to experience a noticeable bias with respect
to rank, but pre- and post-gaps experience a small bias.
However, pre- and post-gaps are strongly connected to
being outside of the top 1M, supporting the hypothe-
sis that pre- and post-gaps are partially caused by ex-
tremely low website popularity or non-existence.
Appendix D Monitoring market
trends
Term counting. We expect that certain patterns are
likely to change from policy to policy, even though they
have the same semantic meaning. One example is the
term “please contact us at” followed by an email ad-
dress. In order to account for this we replace URLs,
email addresses, and named entities with placehold-
ers. Then we impute mid-gaps to be the closest, pre-
ceding snapshot. We first break each document down
into terms—n-grams and sentences. In terms of n-
grams, we specifically examined 1,2,3, and 5-grams. Us-
ing NLTK [85], we constructed n-grams by first breaking
the text into sentences, converting to lowercase, remov-
ing stopwords and words without alphabetic characters,
then creating the n-grams. We also treated the URLs
and NER entities as distinct types of terms. Because
we are interested in the adoption of terms by parties,
we count the document frequency of the terms. Miss-
ing policies that are not imputed do not contribute any
terms.
Term extraction. We reduce the set of terms that
could be of interest by finding terms that ever occur in at
least 0.5% of policies in a single interval, for performance
reasons. To remove bias with respect to the number of
policies in an interval, we normalize document frequency
by the number of policies. We then score each term by
the following metrics:
1. Variance – the variance of term count
2. Difference – The absolute value of the difference
the count at the start interval and end interval
3. Gain – The difference between the count at the
highest interval and the lowest interval
4. Loss – As in Gain, but negated
5. Sum – The sum of the counts in all intervals
6. Local Positive Slope – For two points with
heights A, B, separated by w intervals, the Local
Positive Slope is A−B. We vary w from 1 to 5.
7. Local Negative Slope – As in Local Positive
Slope, but we compute B −A.
8. Spike – Peak prominence as implemented by
SciPy [86].
For each term type and scoring metric, we record the
top 50 terms for expert consideration.
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Appendix E Privacy policy
exclusion criteria
As described in Section 5.1, we excluded documents
from our corpus that met any of the following criteria.
Incomplete privacy policies. The document con-
tains an incomplete privacy policy.
Terms of use and terms of service. The docu-
ment is a “Terms of Use” or a “Terms of Service” page,
which might or might not contain a section dedicated
to privacy.
Cookie Policies. The document is a “cookie
policy”—that is, it only describes the behavior of the
website in regards to cookies.
Security policies. The document is a “security
policy,” which exclusively describes the security tech-
nologies employed by the website, such as the TLS.
Mixed documents. The document contains para-
graphs that appear to be unrelated to a privacy policy.
In other words, in order for a document to be classi-
fied as a privacy policy, every section of the document
must be pertinent to privacy. Privacy centers. The
document is a landing page that does not contain the
privacy policy and, instead, only contains links to the
privacy policy.
Privacy policy summaries. The document con-
tains “highlights” of the privacy policy, often including
a link to a complete version of the privacy policy.
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